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Abstract
This study examines the potential for anomalous response behaviour
eﬀects within the context of double-bounded contingent valuation applied
to community forestry programs in rural Ethiopia. Anomalous responses
considered include shift eﬀects, framing eﬀects, anchoring eﬀects, and oth-
ers closely related to these. The results conﬁrmed the presence of anom-
alous responses, especially shift and framing eﬀects; anchoring eﬀects are
not uncovered. After controlling for these biases, the analysed community
forestry program is shown to oﬀer a welfare gain ranging from Ethiopian
Birr (ETB) 20.14 to 22.80 annually, per household. In addition to uncov-
ering limited welfare beneﬁts, the results raise questions regarding the va-
lidity of previous double-bounded contingent valuation welfare estimates
in developing countries, suggesting that future studies should control for
incentive incompatibility and framing eﬀects bias.
Keywords: Double-bounded contingent valuation, shift bias, anchoring
bias
J.E.L. Classiﬁcation: Q26, Q23, Q28
1 Introduction
The valuation of non-traded goods is complicated, because prices cannot be
observed. Therefore, responses to price changes are not revealed by behav-
iour and welfare eﬀects related to price changes are not easily uncovered. One
common response to these diﬃculties is to evaluate non-market goods via the
Contingent Valuation Method (CVM), since it derives its theoretical basis from
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1welfare economics. One popular CVM survey is the single-bounded, or dichoto-
mous choice design (Whitehead, 2002, Hanemann, 1994, Herriges and Shogren,
1996). The popularity of this design is due to: U.S National Oceanographic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) recommendations (Arrow et al., 1993),
its incentive compatibility property (Haab and McConnel, 2002) and its “take-
it-or-leave-it” format, which mimics the decision-making task individuals face
in daily market transactions (Herriges and Shogren, 1996, Haab and McConnel,
2002). In its simplest form, a respondent is asked if she is willing to pay a given
sum of money in exchange for a speciﬁed change in a non-market good, and the
respondent either agrees to pay or does not.
Despite its popularity, single-bounded CVM (SBCVM) provides limited in-
formation about an individual’s true willingness to pay (Whitehead, 2002, Flachaire,
2006, Herriges and Shogren, 1996), and requires large samples to attain a given
level of precision (Hanemann et al., 1991). These limitations have led researchers
to look for alternative designs that retain incentive compatibility, but are more
eﬃcient (Haab and McConnel, 2002). Hanemann et al. (1991) ﬁrst devised the
double-bounded CVM (DBCVM) format, proving its improved eﬃciency prop-
erties over the single-bounded format. Unlike SBCVM, where the willingness-to-
pay (WTP) is known to lie either above or below a speciﬁed amount, DBCVM
provides additional information. Given its structure, in which an individual is
ﬁrst asked to respond based on one value and then asked to respond to a second
value, DBCVM avails the researcher with additional WTP intervals.1 Estima-
tion of the model incorporates the additional information into the likelihood
function to improve model precision.
The fundamental assumption of the double-bounded model is that the re-
spondent’s preferences remain the same over the two valuation questions, such
that observations are independent across the two responses. Under these as-
sumptions, twice as many observations are available per individual, which yields
greater estimation precision.2 Subsequent studies, however, argue that DBCVM
suﬀers from a number of anomalies. Most poignant of these anomalies is that
the subject’s response to the second question may be inﬂuenced by the ﬁrst
value proposed to them in the survey (Alberni et al., 1997, Flachaire, 2006,
Herriges and Shogren, 1996). In other words, preferences may not remain con-
stant, implying that it is possible to estimate diﬀerent WTP values for the same
individual, leading to inconclusive results; it is unclear which WTP is correct.
Cameron and Quiggin (1994), amongst others, ﬁnd that independence is vio-
lated in their DBCVM survey.
Several hypotheses explaining the dependence between the ﬁrst and second
responses have, since, arisen in the literature. Key, amongst these, is the pres-
1In this study, if the respondent initially says no, the second survey value is speciﬁed to lie
below the ﬁrst. If the respondent initially says yes, the second survey value is speciﬁed to lie
above the ﬁrst
2Hahnemann et al. (1991) compare the information matrices across the SBCVM and
DBCVM. They show that a well-designed bid vector yields lower variances in the DBCVM
relative to the SBCVM, and empirically validate the conclusion. Empirically, they also ﬁnd
lower WTP point estimates in the double-bounded model.
2ence of anchoring and shifting in preferences, which are diﬀerent versions of
starting point bias. The anchoring eﬀect ensues if the respondent, uncertain
about the amenity value of the good, assumes the initial value is informative of
the true value (Herriges and Shogren, 1996, Whitehead, 2002). Therefore, the
respondent may anchor her priors on the initial value. Shift eﬀects, on the other
hand, arise if a respondent understands the ﬁrst value as information regarding
the true cost of the proposal. Under shifting, an individual willing to pay the
opening value, may perceive the second bid as an unfair request to pay an ad-
ditional sum; hence, she will undercut her true WTP. In the same vein, for an
individual, who rejected the ﬁrst bid, the follow-up value could be interpreted
as a lower quality good, leading to WTP reductions (Alberni et al., 1997).
Recent studies have identiﬁed additional sources of preference anomalies that
may arise in DBCVM,3 control for these undesirable eﬀects, and empirically
examine their validity. Early literature includes Herriges and Shorgen (1996),
who test for anchoring, and Alberni et al. (1997), who examine shifting. More
recent examples include Whitehead (2002), who tests for both anchoring and
shifting, as well as Flachiare and Hollard (2006), who test more generally for
any starting point bias. Moreover, Chien et al. (2002) test for the presence of
starting point bias along with compliance bias, wherein an individual violates
incentive compatibility constraints. However, a consensus about which bias is
salient has not been reached.
Herriges and Shogren (1996), for example, ﬁnd evidence of anchoring. Fur-
thermore, controlling for anchoring in their DBCVM leads to less precision
in their WTP estimate, relative to the SBCVM. They conclude that single-
bounded models perform better, in the presence of signiﬁcant anchoring eﬀects.
Whitehead (2002) estimates a random eﬀects probit model, allowing for co-
eﬃcient variation across two sets of take-it-or-leave-it questions to control for
anchoring, and includes a dummy variable for the second question to control
for shifting. Controlling for these eﬀects, Whitehead (2002) ﬁnds a signiﬁcant
improvement in precision in his analysis. However, that gain may not be ob-
tained with another data set. Both Flachaire and Hollard (2006) and Chien
et al. (2005) report evidence of anchoring, while only the former analysis also
uncovers signiﬁcant precision improvements in their WTP point estimates.
Overall, the literature does not provide consistent and robust evidence of
anchoring, shifting and improved estimate precision. Of greater concern is that
the literature related to anchoring and shifting has focused on developed coun-
tries, primarily the US. As the double-bounded format has not featured in the
developing world literature, it has not been possible to consider the generaliz-
ability of these preference anomalies to other countries and cultures. Although
there is steady growth in the CVM literature in developing countries, the fo-
cus has been on biases related to the CVM scenario and survey administration,
rather than anchoring, shifting and related biases. Speciﬁc examples include
3Via the application of Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory, DeShazo (2002)
has established that respondents might frame the follow-up oﬀer as a gain or loss compared
to the initial oﬀer, which results in a downward bias in the WTP for subsamples subjected to
ascending bid sequences.
3the valuation of water quality and sanitation improvements (Whittington al.,
1988, 1990, 1993, Altaf et al., 1993; Singh et al.,1993), biodiversity and recre-
ation (Sattout et al., 2007; Navrud and Mungatana, 1994 and Moran, 1994),
health (Cahn et al., 2006; Cropper et al. 2004 and Whittington et al., 2003)
and forestry (Lynam et al. 1994; Shyansundar et al. 1995; Mekonnen, 2000
and Köhlin, 2000). While these studies aim to provide useful policy information
related to environmental interventions, they do not consider the sorts of biases
discussed above, although Köhlin (2001) and Carlsson et al. (2004) control for
“yea-saying”, which is one form of compliance bias.
Therefore, the main contribution of this research is to provide empirical
evidence related to biases that might arise in a developing country DBCVM
setting, focussing on community forestry programs in Ethiopia. Our data comes
from a contingent valuation study of community plantations in selected rural
villages in Ethiopia. In this analysis, we applied a host of empirical strategies
including interval censored data models, bivariate probit models and various
random eﬀects probit models to examine whether response biases are observed.
Moreover, we compared the parameter estimates of the latter models with that
of SBCVM model to consider the eﬀect of the biases and the underlying precision
of the estimates. The results show that signiﬁcant biases, especially related to
shifting and compliance, arise in our data. However, the hypothesis that peasant
households anchor their willingness to pay to starting bids is rejected.
The analysis is laid out in the following way; Section 2 discusses theoretical
and empirical speciﬁcations. Section 3 describes the design of the contingent
valuation experiment and data collection method. Section 4 presents the results
of the analysis, along with a short discussion. The analysis concludes with
Section 5.
2 Theoretical and Empirical Speciﬁcations
Consider an individual, denoted by i, whose WTP for a non-market good, in
log form, is wit. In keeping with the potential for preference anomalies in the
DBCVM, WTP is allowed to depend on survey timing. Further, assume that the
individual faces two take-it-or-leave-it survey questions, related to their WTP,
which is in line with the DBCVM. She is oﬀered an initial value, to which she
can respond either yes or no. In a follow-up, depending upon the initial answer,
she is oﬀered a diﬀerent value, to which she can also answer either yes or no.
These survey values, referred to as bids, will be denoted, in log form, as bit.
The survey structure yields a set of observed outcomes, Yi = {Yi1,Yi2},
where Yit = {0,1} = {no, yes} are the outcomes from each survey question.
Assuming rationality — an individual does not agree to pay more than she is
willing — the set of observed responses yields a set of intervals for estimating
WTP. Mathematically, Yi = (yes, yes) ⇐⇒ wi ￿ bi2,Yi = (yes, no) ⇐⇒ bi1 ￿
wi < bi2,Yi = (no, yes) ⇐⇒ bi1 > wi ￿ bi2,and Yi = (no, no) ⇐⇒ wi < bi2.
As the purpose of CVM surveys is to elicit WTP, wit is not observed; however,
WTP can be constructed from an empirical analysis that potentially includes
4determinants of WTP, such that wit = χitβt + uit.
2.1 Bivariate Probit
The preceding structure, with a few assumptions, follows a bivariate probit
model. Deﬁne I as an indicator function equal to one if the expression is true,
and zero otherwise, such that Yit = I(wit > bit). Further, assume that the un-
observed WTP can be written as above, wit = χitβt + uit, where uit˜N(0,(σ2
1
ρσ1σ2),(ρσ1σ2 σ2
2))), is a vector of explanatory variables described further,
below, and βit is a vector of parameters to be estimated. Accordingly, if
wi = wi1 = w12 and ρ = 1, observed diﬀerences are due to randomness in the
underlying distribution of the WTP. This restricted bivariate probit is equiva-
lent to the interval model applied by Hanneman et al. (1991). It is also possible
to restrict the model in other ways. For example, assuming that there is no
correlation between the underlying error terms results in probit models that
could be estimated either for each survey question, separately, or pooled across
all survey questions.
2.2 Common Preference Anomalies
The literature oﬀers several explanations for the divergence between SBCVM
and DBCVM, some of which have been described above. These explanations
revolve around the proposition that the response to the second bid is not nec-
essarily independent of the initial bid.
2.2.1 Anchoring Eﬀects
Intuitively, anchored preferences are an adjustment of prior beliefs regarding
WTP, based on the initially proposed bid, and that adjustment yields a posterior
WTP in the Bayesian tradition. That is, the initial oﬀer may serve as an anchor,
if the respondent assumes that the initial oﬀer conveys information on the true
value of the good (DeShazo, 2002). Respondents who are assigned ascending
sequences interpret the follow-up bid as a lower weighted average bid, which
increases the probability of accepting the follow-up bid. On the other hand,
respondents who are assigned a descending sequence may construe the follow-
up bid as a higher weighted average bid, which decreases the probability of
acceptance (Watson and Ryan, 2007, DeShazo, 2002). Therefore, if anchoring
occurs, the middle interval is dependent on the relative strengths of eﬀects in
the upper and lower intervals.
Following Herriges and Shogren (1996), anchoring allows the individual’s
stated WTP to change over the survey, and be related to the initial bid.
wi2 = (1 − γ)wi1 + γbi1 (1)
In equation (1), the posterior WTP is a weighted average of the prior WTP
and the information provided by the initial bid, based on the weighting factor
γ ￿ [0,1], which is assumed constant. If the individual held (very) loose priors
5regarding her own WTP, the posterior WTP would be relatively more dependent
upon the initial bid, and, vice versa.
2.2.2 Shifting Eﬀects
Under shifting, an individual willing to pay the opening bid, may perceive the
second bid as an unfair request to pay an additional sum; hence, she will un-
dercut her true WTP. In the same vein, for an individual, who rejected the ﬁrst
bid, the follow-up value could be interpreted as a lower quality good, leading to
WTP reductions (Alberini et al., 1997). Along these lines, shifting is modelled
as a change in the WTP that is independent of the initial bid.
wi2 = wi1 + δ (2)
2.2.3 Anchoring and Shifting Eﬀects
In the presence of shifting and anchoring, the posterior WTP is modiﬁed to
account for the weighted average of the prior and the initial bid and adjusted
for the shift.
wi2 = (1 − γ)wi1 + γbi1 + δ (3)
Therefore, in the second stage, Yi2 = I((1 − γ)wi1 + γbi1 + δ + ui2 > bi2),
and, in the ﬁrst stage, Yi2 = I(wi1 + ui1 > bi1).
2.3 Additional Preference Anomalies
In addition to the common anomalies of shifting and anchoring, recent research
has oﬀered a more explicit description of eﬀects, most of which relate back to
shifting and anchoring.
2.3.1 Framing Eﬀect
From Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory, DeShazo (2002) argues
that initial approval by respondents can be interpreted as a reference point.
Relative to this reference point, the follow-up question is framed negatively,
and, thus, respondents are more likely to reject the second bid. However, re-
spondents rejecting the ﬁrst bid, such that they are subject to a descending bid
sequence, are assumed not to form a reference point, which results in a diﬀer-
ent behavioural response, compared to respondents subjected to ascending bid
sequences.4 DeShazo (2002), therefore, concludes that response inconsistencies
or preference anomalies are only observable for respondents facing ascending
iterative questions. This conclusion further suggests that the DBCVM model
should only include descending follow-up questions, in practice.
4Flachaire and Hollard (2006) and Watson and Ryan (2007) provide some evidence of
DeShazo’s (2002) framing eﬀects.
62.3.2 Strategic Behaviour Eﬀects
Similar to framing eﬀects are strategic behaviour eﬀects, in the sense that they
are both related to anchoring. With strategic behaviour, respondents may un-
derstate their WTP, in an eﬀort to maximize their gain. Strategic behaviour
arises, because the presence of a follow-up question signals price ﬂexibility. If
respondents understand the double-bounded CVM questionnaire, they may at-
tempt to understate their true WTP, in an eﬀort to game the results (Carson,
1999, DeShazo, 2002). Similarly, the existence of a higher follow-up bid is likely
to increase the probability of rejection, thus resulting in downward bias of re-
ported WTP values (Watson and Ryan, 2007).
2.3.3 Cost Expectations Eﬀects
In addition to anomalies related to anchoring, there are at least two associated
with shifting. One such example is the cost expectations eﬀect. Speciﬁcally,
respondents may understand the ﬁrst bid to be a fair representation of the
actual cost of the good in question, such that the follow-up (higher) bid is seen
as an attempt to obtain funding beyond what is necessary (Carson et al. 1999,
DeShazo, 2002). Under these circumstances, approval, conditional on initial
acceptance, is less likely than it otherwise would be (Watson and Ryan, 2007,
Flachaire and Hollard, 2006, Alberini, 1997). On the other hand, the ﬁrst bid
could be understood to be information related to the quality of the good in
question. Consequently, the respondent is more likely to reject the follow-up
bid than she should be, conditional on rejecting the ﬁrst bid (Alberini, 1997,
DeShazo, 2002). Cost expectation eﬀects are, thus, similar to shifting eﬀects,
except that the shift parameter δ is always negative, suggesting a downward bias
in the WTP (Whitehead, 2002, Flachaire and Hollard, 2006, DeShazo, 2002).
2.3.4 Yea-Saying Eﬀects
Rather than perceiving the bids as information related to the good in question,
respondents may, instead, feel that they should attempt to garner approval
from the survey enumerator by agreeing. Yea-saying bias describes the ten-
dency for respondents to accept any proposed bid. Under these circumstances,
respondents overstate their true WTP in order to acknowledge the interviewer’s
proposition (Flachaire and Hollard, 2006, DeShazo, 2002), and it is often asso-
ciated with ascending bid sequences (DeShazo, 2002, Watson and Ryan, 2007)
rather than with descending bid sequences. The resulting upward bias in WTP
is associated with a shift parameter δ that is always positive (DeShazo, 2002,
Chein et al., 2005 and Watson and Ryan, 2007). In other words, the yea-saying
eﬀect is the exact opposite of the cost expectation eﬀect.
2.4 Implementation
The primary empirical strategy follows Whitehead (2002), whereby random ef-
fects probit models, exploiting the panel structure of DBCVM data, are im-
7plemented. In the model, two observations are available for each individual,
Yit = I(χitβt+uit > bit). The underlying unobserved component can be decom-
posed into an individual (random) eﬀect αi and an idiosyncratic eﬀect, ηit giving
rise to the general error term uit = αi + ηit, where αi˜N(0,σ2
α),ηit˜N(0,σ2
η)
and ε[αiχit] = 0, such that the variance of the unobserved error is V ar(uit) =
σ2
α+σ2
η. Due to the common error component for each individual, that remains
ﬁxed across valuation questions but varies across individuals, the underlying un-
observed error components are correlated, ρα = σ2
α/(σ2
α +σ2
η), which is deﬁned
as a fraction of the variance attributed to the individual speciﬁc eﬀect, αi.
This structure helps us discriminate between models assuming that the WTP
remains constant across valuation questions and those that assume otherwise
(Haab and McConnel, 2002, Alberini et al., 1997). If a fraction of the variance
attributed to the individual speciﬁc component, ρα, is zero then correlation
between the WTP error terms is one.5 The diﬀerence between WTPs is, thus,
due to the random component, ηit. Error component models, thus, collapse to
what is known as interval-censored data models, a simple probit model estimated
over pooled survey responses (Hanneman et al., 1991). However, if a fraction of
the variance attributable to the individual speciﬁc component is non-zero, either
error component models (Alberini, 1997) or bivariate probit models (Cameron
and Quiggin, 1994) could be used for parameter estimation. The problem with
the latter is that it leads to two diﬀerent estimates of WTP, and the true value
would not be identiﬁed.
As alluded to in the preceding subsections, we implemented a range of em-
pirical models in the analysis: unrestricted bivariate probit, restricted bivariate
probit, an interval data model, probit models for SBCVM response and ran-
dom eﬀects probit models. The restricted bivariate probit model imposes cross-
equation parameter restrictions, such that the mean WTP underlying each re-
sponse is identical (β0 = β1). However, unlike the interval data model, which as-
sumes identical mean WTP as well as dispersion parameters (β0 = β1,σ0 = σ1),
the restricted bivariate probit model doesn’t impose equality of the WTP dis-
persion parameter (σ0 ￿= σ1). Therefore, the unrestricted bivariate probit model
nests both the interval data model and the restricted bivariate probit model as
special cases. In terms of the random eﬀects probit model, a number of speciﬁ-
cations are possible. The most general empirical speciﬁcation to be considered
allows for anchoring and shifting within the random eﬀects speciﬁcation. In the
presence of anchor and shift eﬀects, the WTP is deﬁned as in (4).
wt = β0 + Γz + βtbt + δ(t − 1) + γ(t − 1)bt (4)
In equation (4), z represents a vector of individual speciﬁc controls and Γ
represents the vector of parameters to be estimated. For the second survey
question, w2 = β0 +Γz +β2b2 +δ +γb2; however, for the ﬁrst survey question,
5Note that the fraction of the variance attributable to randomness in the WTP, ηit, could










η). It then follows that there is no individual
speciﬁc component, equivalently, σ2
α = 0, implies that ρη = 1.
8w1 = β0 + Γz + β1b1. When neither shifting nor anchoring are assumed to be
present, equation (4) reduces to wt = β0 + Γz + βtbt.
3 Study area, Design and Data
For this analysis, a valuation exercise for WTP elicitation, related to the estab-
lishment of a community forest program, was conducted. The design follows the
DBCVM, and the survey was conducted in selected sites in Ethiopia. These sites
were chosen, because the Ethiopian Federal Ministry of Agriculture, in collab-
oration with World Bank, selected these sites for sustainable land management
interventions. In these sites, as in most parts of rural Ethiopia, communities use
common property woodlands for grazing and fuel wood collection. The areas
selected are, according to the local Departments of Agriculture, experiencing
unprecedented deforestation, as well as increased demand for woody biomass.
Households in these areas use cow dung and crop residues, which could be used,
respectively, for fertilizer or fodder, as sources of energy, and walk long distances
to harvest fuel wood from natural woodlands.
Although Ethiopia has a long history of initiating and implementing com-
munity forestry programs, the experience has not generally been successful, and
that lack of success is at least partly due to an approach that didn’t accom-
modate the preferences of either the local community or the individuals slated
for intervention (Gelo and Koch, 2012). Benin et al. (2002), however, outline
a more recent approach, emphasizing local community involvement in resource
conservation and management, which forms part of the incumbent government’s
rural development polices. This change in government behaviour has led to the
establishment of area enclosures and plantations, and these have been developed
in a more participatory fashion than before. Local Departments of Agriculture
still identify the area to be enclosed or planted; however, the community mem-
bers determine the operational rules associated with these community resources
(Gebremedhin et al., 2003, Fekadu, 2008).
3.1 Survey and Bid Response
The CVM surveys included questions related to WTP for a proposed commu-
nity plantation, as well as information on household socio-economic status. For
the survey, 15 households from each of 40 sites, a total of 600 households, were
randomly selected. A team of trained enumerators conducted the interviews.
However, in order to conduct the CVM study, starting bids were necessary.
Starting bids were obtained from a pilot study of 60 randomly selected house-
holds, in which an open-ended CVM question format was used. The result of
the pilot study was a vector of ﬁve starting bids: 10, 20, 32, 50 and 80.
During data collection, the scenario was ﬁrst described to the respondents.
Following the description, value elicitation questions ensued. To make the sce-
nario as realistic as possible, a suitable area of land for the establishment of
the proposed community plantations was identiﬁed, and its size speciﬁed, for
9each survey site. Following the description, respondents were initially asked if
they were willing to participate in the program.6 For those willing to partici-
pate, they were further asked if they were willing to pay the initial — randomly
assigned — bid. Regardless of whether the respondents were willing to pay the
initial bid, a follow-up question was also asked of the respondent. Follow-up
bids were either 50% of the initial bid, if the initial response was rejected, or
150% of the initial bid, if the initial response was accepted. Table 1 summarizes
the bids and proportion of acceptance for each bid.
In an eﬀort to capture additional inconsistencies, a ﬁnal open-ended ques-
tion, regarding the maximum willingness to pay, was asked of the participants.
In cases where the open-ended value was lower than the approved bid in the
follow-up question, respondents were asked to explain their decision. Follow-
ing Carlsson et al. (2004), we recoded the inconsistent responses into a “no”
response for the second bid. Köhlin (2001) argues that these inconsistencies
are obtained when respondents want to conform to social norms, especially in
cultures characterized by courtesy, collective decision-making or paternalistic
decision-making.
3.2 Additional Survey Data
As noted above, the survey included questions related to a number of socio-
economic variables, including the sex of respondent, the age and education (both
in years) of the household head, the size of the household, the household’s non-
food expenditure, the household’s ownership of livestock (measured in tropical
livestock units, where 1TLU=250kg), a measure of forest access, based on GIS
data, distance to the nearest town, land holdings, a measure of wealth (whether
a household has corrugated metal on their house or not) and experimentally
determined household rates of time preferences.7 Descriptive statistics of this
data are presented in Table 2.
We postulate that the demand for community forestry depends on covariates
vindicated by economic theory. These include income and wealth, the price of
the good, other prices and other taste shifters. From this list, covariates were
sorted into three broad categories: (1) wealth and income — ownership of a house
with corrugated rooﬁng, land holdings and non-food expenditure; (2) the price
of the good — livestock ownership, rate of time preference and education; (3)
other prices — access to alternative forests, household size, and the distance to
town.
Whereas proxies for wealth and income are relatively clear, variables used
as price proxies merit further explanation. With regard to the price of the
good, community forestry involves both temporal and intertemporal trade-oﬀs.
6About 6.5% of the respondent protested in the sense that they weren’t willing to partici-
pate. These responses are not included in the analysis.
7A subject was asked the maximum sum that he/she would be willing pay one year from
now, if he/she had borrowed ETB 100 today. The rate of time preference was calculated from
this value using the net present value formula. The question was adopted from Andersson et
al. (2011).
10Speciﬁcally, the establishment of community forestry on grazing land implies a
potential income loss from livestock production, as grazing land is a major in-
put for production. Moreover, given that community forestry establishment and
management requires labour, income from alternative employment may have to
be sacriﬁced, the value of which depends on the level of education. Therefore,
such opportunity costs should be construed as part of the cost of establishing
the community forest, in addition to the direct contribution suggested by the
proposed bids. We, therefore, hypothesize that both the level of education and
the ownership of livestock are expected to reduce the demand for community
forestry. Likewise, community forestry involves an intertemporal trade-oﬀ; the
beneﬁts given up today to establish the programme must be weighed against
beneﬁts that accrue at later dates. We capture these intertemporal trade-oﬀs
through the household head’s rate of time preference, assuming that this rate is
inversely related to the demand for community forestry. Moreover, we presume
that time preferences are dependent on household wealth measures (education,
landholding and ownership of corrugated house etc.) and household head char-
acteristics, such as age and sex.
With regard to proxies for other prices, recall that both access to alternative
forests, typically open access natural forests, and the opportunity to buy from
markets, as measured by the distance to town, are potential community forestry
substitutes. We, therefore, argue that better access to alternative forests and
shorter distances to town will lower forest product prices. Subsequently, these
measures are expected to be associated with reduced demand for community
forestry. Moreover, the size of the household is likely to reduce WTP, partly
because larger households have less discretionary income per capita and partly
because a larger household increases the supply of labour available for collecting
forest products from open access forests.
4 Empirical Results
In this section, we present the results of the empirical analysis, including tests
for preference anomalies. Following these tests, we present the welfare analysis.
Speciﬁcally, we present the valuation of the program’s perceived welfare beneﬁts,
based on a host of empirical strategies that include determinants of household
WTP.
4.1 Testing for Preferences Anomalies
The bid-response data conform to a priori expectations, as informed by eco-
nomic theory; the share of acceptances generally falls as the bid rises (see Table
1). Moreover, from an analysis of raw data, we found that some households
chose to give lower WTP values in the open ended follow-up question than wase
uncovered from the closed-end questions; 14.7% of respondents were inconsis-
tent in this way. Köhlin (2001) oﬀers several explanations regarding the sources
of this inconsistency, which include yea-saying (or compliance bias), strategic
11behaviour and cultural bargaining experiences that might be triggered by the
preference elicitation format. In our case, when asked to explain responses that
were inconsistent, 2.5% of the subjects reported that they wanted to please the
enumerator, 42.5% thought it was obligatory to report, 52.5% felt they were
too poor and could not aﬀord to pay, while 2.5% gave other reasons. Accord-
ing to these responses, 45% of the inconsistencies arose from “yea-saying” or
compliance bias.
In what follows, we test for a number of bias eﬀects by employing a range
of empirical models. To that eﬀect, we ﬁrst ﬁt restricted bivariate models,
an interval data model and unrestricted bivariate probit models (see Table 3).
The likelihood ratio test supports the hypothesis that the unrestricted bivari-
ate probit models and restricted bivariate probit model ﬁt the data better than
the interval data model, χ2 = 61.54, p = 0.00 and χ2 = 77.56,p = 0.001,
respectively. However, the unrestricted bivariate probit model is not an im-
provement over the restricted bivariate probit model, χ2 = 16.04,p = 1. In
addition to these tests, we ﬁnd that the error correlation deviates signiﬁcantly
from unity, p = 0.528 for the unrestricted bivariate probit and p = 0.553 for the
restricted bivariate probit, supporting the hypothesis that WTP varies across
the valuation questions. Equivalently, the results lend support to the claim that
preference anomalies are present in the responses and that parameter estimates
from standard double-bounded models are not appropriate for inference.
Moreover, via a likelihood ratio test, as was done in DeShazo (2002), we
test whether parameter consistency holds across the two WTP equations for the
ascending bid sequence subsample and descending bid sequence subsample. The
results revealed that the null hypothesis of parameter consistency for descending
bid sequence subsample could not be rejected (χ2 = 1.54,p = 0.67). In contrast,
the null hypothesis of parameter consistency for the ascending bid subsample
is rejected (χ2 = 769.75,p = 0.00). When combined, these results lead us to
reject the null hypothesis that there are no framing eﬀects within the survey.8
4.2 Controlling for Preferences Anomalies
Given the preference anomalies observed in the preceding analysis, we also im-
plement a series of random eﬀect probit models accounting for WTP variation
and compare those results with that of a single-bound probit model and a ran-
dom eﬀects probit model. The random eﬀects probit model is denoted as the
naïve model, as it assumes equal WTP values across bid questions; hence, we
don’t account for anchoring or incentive eﬀects or both. Comparing the single-
bound and random eﬀects probit model, we see that the latter yields lower
WTP point estimates, as well as lower standard errors. This ﬁnding supports
Hanemann et al. (1991), who conclude that double-bounded models yield both
lower point estimates and improved eﬃciency.
8Note that these results also point to the presences of a yea-saying eﬀect. However, as we
have controlled for yea-saying problems, by discarding responses, as discussed earlier, the test
points to the presences of framing eﬀects.
12In what follows, we return to models that account for diﬀerences in WTP. In
other words, we control for shift-eﬀects and starting point biases (see Table 4).
The shift eﬀect is introduced as a dummy variable, A, to test whether willingness
to pay diﬀers across the valuation questions. This model is referred to as the
shift eﬀect model, hereafter. Our results point to both negative and statistically
signiﬁcant shift eﬀects, suggesting that there is a negative shift eﬀect following
the ﬁrst valuation question. The result is in line with Alberini et al. (1997) and
Whitehead (2002). The negative sign implies that there is a downward shift in
WTP, sometimes referred to as nay-saying (Chien et al., 2005) as opposed to
yea-saying. Equivalently, the result conﬁrms that there is no yea-saying bias,
partly because it has been controlled for in the analysis — inconsistent responses
to open-ended follow-up questions were discarded.
The shift eﬀect model was then altered to, instead, allow for anchoring. In
the anchoring eﬀect model, An is introduced to capture potential starting point
bias. The results point to negative and signiﬁcant anchoring eﬀects. Although
the absolute value of the coeﬃcient lies in the unit interval, it implies a negative
starting point eﬀect, which violates the assumptions of the standard anchor-
ing eﬀect model. Consequently, we cannot conclude that anchoring eﬀects are
present. Our conclusion is contrary to Chien et al. (2005), Whitehead (2002)
and Flachaire and Hollard (2006), all of which found evidence of anchoring bias
in their data.
In case the anchoring eﬀect was inappropriately capturing other eﬀects, we
accounted for the simultaneous presence of both shift eﬀects and anchoring
eﬀects. This model is referred to as the shift-anchor model, hereafter. As with
the shift model, the estimated shift eﬀect is negative, implying a downward shift
in WTP. Similarly, as with the anchor eﬀect model, the anchoring coeﬃcient
remains negative. Moreover, the likelihood ratio test indicates that this model is
not an improvement over the shift-eﬀect model, χ2 = 0.78,p = 0.382. However,
the likelihood ratio test also conﬁrmed that all of these models outperform
the random eﬀects probit model and anchor model. Generally, the WTP point
estimate is lower in all of the bias corrected models (shift-eﬀect, anchoring eﬀect
and shift-anchor eﬀect models) compared to the single-bound estimate.
Finally, the preceding random eﬀects probit models were implemented for
both the ascending bid sequence subsample and the descending bid sequence
subsample, separately. In each of these subsamples, the shifting eﬀect is present
in the shift and shift-anchor models. As before, we fail to detect evidence of
anchoring eﬀects in either of the subsamples for either the anchor-eﬀect or the
shift-anchor eﬀects model.
4.3 Welfare and Estimation Eﬃciency
Although the existence of preference anomalies is interesting, on its own, the
primary purpose of CVM is the elicitation of preferences. Preference anomalies
should be controlled in the analysis, such that appropriate welfare estimates can
be obtained. Upon calculation of the welfare eﬀects, we found that the shift-
eﬀect model yielded the lowest median willingness to pay, ETB 20.14, whereas
13the anchor-eﬀect model and the shift-anchor model yielded slightly higher WTP
estimates, ETB 22.80 and ETB 30.41, respectively. However, WTP values for
either the ascending or descending bid sequence subsamples were generally lower
than for the full sample. As elucidated earlier, the likelihood ratio test results
for model selection support the choice of the shift-eﬀect and shift-anchor random
eﬀects probit models, although the shift-anchor eﬀects model yields an incon-
sistent, with respect to theory, negative anchor eﬀect. As such, we report the
willingness to pay estimate for these models as our measure of the community
forestry welfare impact, which ranged between ETB20.14 and ETB22.80. How-
ever, our preferred estimate is the lower estimate of ETB20.14, as the higher
estimate includes the inconsistent negative anchoring eﬀect.
In addition to examining the welfare eﬀect, estimated eﬃciency is also rele-
vant, given the fact that the double-bounded model has been shown to be more
eﬃcient. The welfare estimate, median WTP, is computed from the model
parameters, and, hence its distribution depends on the distribution of the para-
meters. The Delta method is used to derive the standard errors of the welfare
estimates (Greene 1997). On the basis of eﬃciency, as measured by the relative
standard errors, all of the random-eﬀects probit models (naïve, shift, anchor-
ing, and shift and anchoring models) outperform the single-bounded models.
Amongst, the random-eﬀects probit models, the shift-eﬀect model yielded the
lowest standard error estimate.
4.4 Welfare Determinants
Further analysis of the bid function allows for the identiﬁcation of salient de-
terminants of WTP. In the analysis, the parameters, which capture the link
between socio-economic covariates and WTP, for the most part, accord with
our a priori expectations. However, some do not, which led to additional in-
vestigation, discussed below. The results are reported in Table 5 and Table 6.
In Table 5, the random-eﬀects probit models with selected covariates are pre-
sented. One concern that arises in an analysis of this nature is that the model
could suﬀer from endogeneity, arising, especially, from the relationship between
the rate of time preference and the error term.
Along those lines, Davidson and MacKinnon’s (1993) test rejected the hy-
pothesis that the rate of time preference is exogenous (χ2 = 05.31,p = 0.02).
Therefore, the models were extended to include IV methods. The rate of time
preference was instrumented by household head age, gender, land holdings per
capita and wealth variables. Following Davis and Kim (2002), instrument rel-
evance based on Shea’s (1997) partial r2, revealed that the null hypothesis of
no instrument relevance is rejected (r2 = eigenvalue = 0.027). Therefore, IV
results are further discussed. Once IV methods were applied, previously incon-
sistent, with expectations, parameter estimates were found to conform to our a
priori expectations. For example, initially, the rate of time preference estimate
and the estimate for the measure of access to alternative forests were counter-
intuitive — they were positive — in the uncorrected random eﬀects model. Fol-
lowing correction, the signs changed, yielding results that were consistent with
14our expectations.
As expected, the parameter on (logged) bids is negative and signiﬁcant, sup-
porting the claim that respondents are rational, when faced with increasing cost.
In addition, the (logged) income eﬀect is also positive and signiﬁcant, implying
that community forestry is a normal good. Livestock ownership eﬀects were es-
timated to be negative and signiﬁcant, suggesting that rural Ethiopian farmers
believe there are signiﬁcant opportunity costs, mostly in the form of reduced
grazing land, associated with community forestry. Household size, although
not signiﬁcant, is found to be positive, which was not expected. Possibly, larger
households require more biomass, which may oﬀset the eﬀect of increased labour
supply. Similarly, other price proxies — access to alternative forests and the dis-
tance to town, carry the expected signs, but are not signiﬁcant. Finally, the rate
of time preference is found to be an insigniﬁcant, but negative, determinant of
WTP, as expected.
5 Conclusion
SBCVM has desirable properties, such as incentive compatibility and survey
implementation beneﬁts; however, proper implementation requires a relatively
large sample. The DBCVM has been employed as an alternative method to
improve eﬃciency, i.e., requires fewer survey respondents. However, it also
suﬀers from biases resulting from a range of preference anomalies, including
anchoring eﬀects, shift eﬀects and other biases. Although several studies have
tested for these biases, the majority of these studies have been undertaken in
developed countries.
In this study, we applied a DBCVM format and tested for the aforemen-
tioned biases, employing a host of empirical strategies. Our data comes from a
contingent valuation survey of community plantations in selected rural villages
in Ethiopia. The analysis revealed that there are signiﬁcant preference anom-
alies in our data. However, the hypothesis that peasant households anchor their
WTP to the starting bid is rejected. Estimation of compensated variation, as
a welfare measure, after controlling for the preference anomalies, showed that
community forestry programs oﬀer welfare gains of approximately ETB20.14 for
this study’s peasant households. Furthermore, controlling for shift eﬀects and
anchoring eﬀects improved the statistical precision of the welfare estimate, a
result that conﬁrms a number of the developed country studies.
Moreover, analysis of bid functions found that household income, program
establishment costs and livestock holdings are important determinants of WTP.
The ﬁrst of these suggests that community forestry is a normal good, while
the eﬀect of program establishment costs are consistent with the expectation
that increased prices reduce demand. The last of these results points to oppor-
tunity costs related to foregone grazing land, land that would be required to
establish the community forest. This result also implies that the establishment
of community forestry, in livestock dependent and land-poor villages will be a
welfare-reducing proposition, especially if implementation costs are high.
15Overall, the results provide support to the furtherance of community forestry
programs, as they oﬀer signiﬁcant, but economically small, welfare beneﬁts to
rural Ethiopian households, at least for the households in this study. Addition-
ally, the failure to account for shift-eﬀect bias and other biases yields an incon-
sistent welfare estimate within the DBCVM. Therefore, although such methods
improve relative precision, care must be taken in their use in developing coun-
tries, as well as developed countries.
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5  0.50  10  0.91  15  0.74 
10  0.41  20  0.76  30  0.57 
16  0.66  32  0.75  48  0.55 
25  0.43  50  0.70  75  0.28 
40  0.37  80  0.57  120  0.23 
Note: Initially randomly assigned bids in centre columns. If respondents answered no, 
they  were  offered  the  “No”  follow-up  bid  in  the  second  question.  If  the  respondents 
answered  yes,  they  were  offered  the  “Yes”  follow-up  bid  in  the  second  question. 
Therefore, each row refers to DBCVM based on the initial bid. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of survey data 
Variable  Description  Mean  Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
density  Per-hectare biomass per-capita  0.25  0.50  0  3 
tlu  Animal holdings (TLUs)  8.64  6.53  0  42 
sex  =1 if respondent is  male  0.89  0.30  0  1 
age  Household head age  45.43  12.74  23  90 
hhsize  Household size  6.48  2.42  1  15 
yrsschool  Household head education  5.50  2.94  0  14 
expenditure  Non-food expenditure/year  4184.10  5402.80  122  36500 
wealth   Corrugated house  0.40    0.49  0  1 
lndszpc  Land holding per capita in hectare  0.82  0.97  0    5 
rtp   Rate of time preference   0.25  0.28  0  2 
WTP  Open-ended WTP  38.80  24.86  10  80 
WTPa  Open-ended WTPa  55.13  40.16  10  240 
WTPd  Open-ended WTPd  8.88  5.68  1  20 
Note: WTPa and WTPd, respectively, refer to open-ended willingness to pay for ascending bid and 
descending bid subsamples of doubled bounded CVM questions.
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Ln(b2)        -0.573*** 
(0.0814) 
           
                   
Ln(b)              -0.540** 
(0.0953) 
    -0.208 
(0.166) 
                   




















Ln(Likelihood)  -298.75  -637.942  -645.952  -645.952  .   -630.579  -245.703  -245.703  -114.252  -113.483  -113.483 
rho    0.553  0.528  0.528  0.616  0.139  0.132  0.114  -0.047  -0.047 
Observations    550  550  550  408  408  408  145  145  145 




















                     
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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(0.0017)   
A      -0.479*** 
(0.1340) 
  -0.358* 
(0.1930) 




    -0.953*** 
(0.186) 
-3.022*** 
(0.270)                 











(0.00552)                 
Constant  0.782**  2.701***  2.930***  2.898***  2.942***  1.368***  2.741**  1.851***  4.343*** 
(0.449) 
1.404***  2.853**  1.853***  4.356*** 
  (0.3315)  (0.374)  (0.345)  (0.344)  (0.346)  (0.463)  (1.202)  (0.320)  (0.454)  (1.143)  (0.321)  (0.449) 
Observations    1,086  1,086  1,086  1,086  1,086  1,086  1,086  1,086  1,086  1,086  1,086  1,086 
Log-likelihood    -656.91  -654.05  -655.40  -653.66  -689.81  -483.39  -685.47  -477.16  -689.71  -482.93  -685.45  -476.83 








14.98***   
(5.26) 
15.93   
(18.57) 












Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
22Table 5. Parameter estimates of random-effect probit model with covariates  
 












A    -0.545**      -0.992***  -3.926***      -1.066***  -4.163*** 
    (0.226)    -0.711**  (0.220)  (0.314)      (0.304)  (0.500) 
An      -0.00651 
(0.00771) 
(0.0417)      -0.000442  0.00444  0.00201  0.00626 
      0.260**      (0.00601)  (0.00997)  (0.00572)  (0.00987) 
lntotexp  0.292**  0.294**  0.292**  (0.315)  0.356***  0.172  0.355***  0.169  0.357***  0.170 
  (0.130)  (0.131)  (0.130)  0.00452  (0.127)  (0.158)  (0.126)  (0.157)  (0.127)  (0.158) 
lnbid  -0.648***  -0.633***  0.647***  (0.00604)  -0.360**  -0.968***  -0.366**  -0.970***  -0.364**  -0.979*** 
  (0.166)  (0.166)  (0.167)  0.295**  (0.155)  (0.220)  (0.155)  (0.220)  (0.155)  (0.221) 
tlu  -0.0114  -0.0115  -0.0115  (0.131)  -0.0101  -0.0112  -0.0101  -0.0109  -0.00996  -0.0108 
  (0.00730)  (0.00731)  (0.00734)  -0.643***  (0.00626)  (0.0119)  (0.00627)  (0.0116)  (0.00624)  (0.0116) 
hhsz  0.108**  0.109**  0.109**  (0.167)  0.116**  0.0381  0.116**  0.0375  0.116**  0.0375 
  (0.0544)  (0.0545)  (0.0544)  -0.0111  (0.0523)  (0.0662)  (0.0522)  (0.0659)  (0.0524)  (0.0662) 
dstwn  0.000154  0.000152  0.000153  (0.0546)  -0.000246  0.000416  -0.000245  0.000432  -0.000239  0.000446 
  (0.00145)  (0.00145)  (0.00145)  0.241  (0.00143)  (0.00184)  (0.00143)  (0.00184)  (0.00143)  (0.00184) 
fdensity  0.00431  0.00444  0.00435  (0.249)  0.132  0.0618  0.132  0.0597  0.132  0.0589 
  (0.288)  (0.289)  (0.288)  0.000164  (0.284)  (0.361)  (0.283)  (0.360)  (0.284)  (0.361) 
rtp  0.403  0.406  0.400  (0.00145)  0.162  0.560  0.159  0.563  0.169  0.571 
  (0.375)  (0.376)  (0.376)  0.00408  (0.352)  (0.481)  (0.352)  (0.481)  (0.353)  (0.485) 
age  -0.0214  -0.0217  -0.0216  (0.289)  -0.0248*  -0.00838  -0.0248*  -0.00804  -0.0245*  -0.00798 
  (0.0137)  (0.0137)  (0.0138)  0.424  (0.0133)  (0.0172)  (0.0133)  (0.0172)  (0.0133)  (0.0172) 
edu  0.0166  0.0164  0.0164  (0.377)  -0.00879  0.0531  -0.00877  0.0540  -0.00798  0.0549 
  (0.0415)  (0.0416)  (0.0416)  -0.0208  (0.0399)  (0.0528)  (0.0399)  (0.0527)  (0.0400)  (0.0530) 
  (0.121)  (0.121)  (0.121)  0.0180  (0.118)  (0.151)  (0.118)  (0.151)  (0.118)  (0.151) 
Constant  0.890  1.104  0.908  (0.121)  0.0499  3.007*  -0.406  0.969  0.0403  3.030* 
  (1.354)  (1.345)  (1.370)  1.081  (1.284)  (1.690)  (1.332)  (2.216)  (1.284)  (1.690) 
        (1.346)             
Log-
likelihood 
-246.893  -244.797  -246.889  -244.515  -258.081  -170.503  -261.439  -175.960  -258.019  -170.306 
Observation  928  928  928  928  928  928  928  928  928  928 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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rtp  -1.294  -1.319  -1.373  -1.349  -1.349  -2.034  -0.0126  -2.145  -0.238  -2.099  -0.0231 
  (1.098)  (1.106)  (1.151)  (1.156)  (1.156)  (1.406)  (0.632)  (1.488)  (0.808)  (1.484)  (0.654) 
A    -0.0963*      -0.0792  -0.192***  -0.690***      -0.135  -0.707*** 
    (0.0559)      (0.0911)  (0.0711)  (0.0320)      (0.117)  (0.0515) 
An      -0.00161  -0.000466  -0.000466      -0.00351**  -0.00981***  -0.00155  0.000458 
      (0.00126)  (0.00198)  (0.00198)      (0.00163)  (0.000884)  (0.00254)  (0.00112) 
lntotexp  0.0584*  0.0582*  0.0586*  0.0584*  0.0584*  0.0743*  0.0237  0.0750*  0.0257  0.0746*  0.0237 
  (0.0315)  (0.0317)  (0.0323)  (0.0321)  (0.0321)  (0.0403)  (0.0181)  (0.0418)  (0.0227)  (0.0412)  (0.0181) 
lnbid  -0.109***  -0.0996**  -0.1000**  -0.0985**  -0.0985**  -0.0539  -0.103***  -0.0532  -0.116***  -0.0507  -0.104*** 
  (0.0394)  (0.0401)  (0.0418)  (0.0412)  (0.0412)  (0.0510)  (0.0229)  (0.0540)  (0.0293)  (0.0530)  (0.0233) 
tlu  -0.00277*  -0.00280*  -0.00292*  -0.00285*  -0.00285*  -0.00300  -0.00117  -0.00327  -0.00185  -0.00314  -0.00113 
  (0.00156)  (0.00157)  (0.00162)  (0.00163)  (0.00163)  (0.00199)  (0.000896)  (0.00210)  (0.00114)  (0.00210)  (0.000923) 
hhsz  0.0130  0.0131  0.0133  0.0131  0.0131  0.0138  0.00313  0.0143  0.00434  0.0140  0.00307 
  (0.0125)  (0.0125)  (0.0128)  (0.0127)  (0.0127)  (0.0160)  (0.00717)  (0.0165)  (0.00898)  (0.0163)  (0.00717) 
dstwn  0.000318  0.000321  0.000328  0.000326  0.000326  0.000383  7.81e-05  0.000396  0.000106  0.000392  7.76e-05 
  (0.000453)  (0.000456)  (0.000467)  (0.000464)  (0.000464)  (0.000580)  (0.000261)  (0.000604)  (0.000328)  (0.000596)  (0.000262) 
fdensity  -0.0677  -0.0696  -0.0722  -0.0714  -0.0714  -0.0837  -0.00349  -0.0888  -0.00635  -0.0872  -0.00385 
  (0.106)  (0.107)  (0.110)  (0.110)  (0.110)  (0.136)  (0.0612)  (0.142)  (0.0772)  (0.141)  (0.0619) 
Constant  0.732**  0.751**  0.744**  0.712**  0.752**  0.594  0.909***  0.582  0.844***  0.595  0.909*** 
  (0.325)  (0.327)  (0.334)  (0.338)  (0.331)  (0.416)  (0.187)  (0.432)  (0.235)  (0.425)  (0.187) 
Observations  928  928  928  928  928    928                   928                928                   928                   928                  928 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
24Appendix A. CVM questionnaire  
Suppose that the got development committee (GDC) proposes to establish a new community 
forest plantation on communal grazing land. Also suppose that this plan is endorsed by the 
kebele administration and district office of agriculture.   
The community forest plantation offers you the following benefits: 
You are able to access fuel wood, and it reduces the household time required to collect fuel 
wood  from  distant  woodlands  and/or  other  forests.  The  time  saved  can  be  used  for 
agricultural activities, marketing or social activities. Moreover, it allows you to use crop-
residue and animal dung for soil management instead of using them for fuel. In addition, it 
provides  animal  feed  (fodder),  particularly  during  the  dry  season,  when  fodder  from 
communal woodland is rarely available. You can also use leaves  from the plantation for 
medicinal  purposes.  When  the  plantation  reaches  harvesting  age,  you  can  share  timber 
products from the plantation for construction material and agricultural implements. You can 
either use these products for yourself or sell them to generate cash, depending on your need. 
However, you should note that the communal grazing land used for the forest plantation is 
not going to be used for grazing any longer for many years to come.  
The proposed woodlot has the following characteristics: 
species mix:   Eucalyptus  
harvest quota:  __30____meter cube 
type of place:  x grazing land  
Also note that the government doesn’t have access to sufficient funds to finance the project. 
Therefore, the plantation can only be established if the got community contributes money 
towards the establishment of the forest and the management thereof.   
The contribution is required from the community for: 
  establishing a community nursery and/or purchasing seedlings; 
  site preparation: clearing the site, digging holes and fencing the site; and 
  employing guards to protect against theft. 
It is also important to note that the control and the management of the contributed funds are 
to be entrusted to the development committee. By law, the committee cannot divert these 
25funds to any other purpose. Note that the money will be collected by the committee after the 
main crop harvest each year. The contribution is to be paid from each community member 
household, annually, for five consecutive years.   
When we talked to other people in your village, we have found people who would be willing 
to vote in favour of the project and those who would not be in favour. Each group has many 
reasons to vote either for or against, and neither group is wrong. 
Those in favour of the project say that: 
  Increased forest product availability is worth some cost; 
  They are tired of walking long distances to fetch fire wood and other forest products; 
  They want to reduce their farm fertility loss through the application of manure (dung) 
and crop residues, rather than using these products for fuel; 
  They  need  supplemental  feed  sources  for  their  cattle,  particularly  during  the  dry 
season; 
  Timber products for construction and farm implements are becoming more scarce. 
Those not in favour of the project say that: 
  A new community forest plantation would reduce available  grazing land for their 
animals; 
  They would rather use their money for other purposes; 
  They own private woodlots or have other alternatives forestry access, such that they 
do not need a community forest; 
  They cannot afford the time required to attend a series of meetings related to the 
management of the community forest plantation.  
Now that we have explained the purposes of this project, and provided you with information 
from other potential participants in the community, we would now like you to consider this 
project  for  yourself.  Given  the  information  that  we  have  provided  in  relation  to  the 
establishment  of  a  new  community  forest  plantation,  could  you  answer  the  following 
questions?  
1. Before proceeding, do you have any questions about the establishment of a community 
forest plantation, as outlined above? 
Yes………………1,           
26No… ……………2 (go to 2) 
1.1 What would you like to know? 
If the respondent asks about costs, tick here     and say: “ we will come to that in a moment.”  
2. Might you be willing to contribute help establish a community forest? 
Yes………………1,          No………………2 
2.1 If no, why? Use code A 
3. As we said earlier the actual cost of the project is not known. However, if you are a 
decision maker in your household and asked to contribute Birr __________ annually for five 
consecutive years, would your household be willing to contribute that amount?  
             1. Yes       Go to   4   
  2. No         Go to  5 
 4. What if you are asked, instead, to contribute Birr_________ annually for five consecutive 
years, would your household be willing to contribute that amount?  
         1. Yes   2. No 
5. What if you are asked, instead, to contribute Birr_________ annually for five consecutive 
years, would your household be willing to contribute that amount?  
6. What would be the maximum annual amount that your household would be willing to 
contribute? Birr___________ 
6.1 To enumerators: probe if the answer is yes to 4 or 5  and the maximum willingness to pay 
in 6 is less than the amount agreed to pay in 4 or 5 as follows;  
  Why is it that the maximum annual amount that your household would be willing to 
contribute is less than the amount you initially agreed to contribute? Use code B 
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